The phase-shifting interferometry-based (PSI-based) encryption is one of most typical optical encryption systems. In this paper, we demonstrate a new approach to ciphertext-only attack (COA) on PSI-based encryption, revealing that there is serious security risk in PSI-based encryption. With the proposed COA approach, an opponent can crack the ciphertexts directly without use of the keys of the system. This demonstration, as far as our best knowledge, shows the PSI technique is vulnerable to COA for the first time. A series of attack results are shown to demonstrate the feasibility and robustness of the attack method. Our study reveals a critical security issue that should be taken in to account when designing an optical information security system.
Introduction
Optical encryption has raised many researcher's interests owing to its inherent capability for parallel processing [1] . Since the double random phase encoding (DRPE) was proposed [2] , a number of researchers focus on it and give massive extensions, such as the DRPE scheme in different domains [3] - [5] , the joint transformation correlator (JTC) encryption [6] - [8] and multiple-image encryption [9] - [11] , and the PSI-based encryption [12] - [20] , etc [21] - [22] . During these extensions, the PSI-based cryptosytem is one of most typical encryption methods which has been demonstrated experimentally due to its convenience to perform accurate alignment. However, as any other encryption systems, the PSI-based encryption could be claimed to be security and widely used in the practical use only if it is able to endure the attacks of various cryptanalysis methods. Dependent on the type of information available, typical cryptoanalysis methods can be categorized as the chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) [23] , the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) [24] - [26] , the knownplaintext attack (KPA) [27] - [30] , the ciphertext-only attack (COA) [31] - [33] . Among these, the COA is the most challenging one as it requires the least knowledge about the encryption machine. Therefore, an encryption method is generally said to be not secure at all if it is vulnerable to COA, as any plaintext encrypted by it will be disclosed by properly analyzing the corresponding ciphertext alone [33] . In this paper, we demonstrate that the PSI-based encryption is vulnerable to the COA. We note that the previous work has reported a CPA and KPA method [34] - [35] . But compared with CPA and KPA, it relies on a strong assumption that the some additional resources or prior knowledge should be known, for example, some plaintext-ciphertexts pairs. These conditions are often hard to satisfy in practical situations [32] . Alternatively, the approach we employed in the present COA works without the need to have a prior knowledge about the support of plaintext image. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first demonstration of COA to the PSI-based method. Our study reveals a critical security risk that should be taken into account when designing an optical information security problems.
Theoretical Analysis

Principle of Proposed PSI Cryptosystem
Here, we concisely review the PSI-based encryption system. Among the existing PSI-based cryptosystem, some applies four-step PSI [12] , and three-step [13] or two-step [14] - [15] , etc. In fact, the basic principle of these schemes is similar. Therefore, the four-step PSI method is taken as an example and briefly describe the PSI-based cryptosystem. Fig. 1 shows the scheme of PSI-based cryptosystem. The system is based on Mach-Zehnder interferometer architecture. A random phase mask M 1 is attached to the plaintext in the object beam, and another random phase mask M 2 is placed at a variable position in the reference arm. The phase shifting setup (for example PZT mirror) located in the reference beam is to provide 0, −π/2, −π/ and −3π/2 phase-shifting. In this way, four corresponding interferograms with different phase-shifting values are captured in turn by the detector. Note that Fig. 1 is just a principle scheme of the PSI-based cryptosystem. In the practical PSI-based cryptosystem, the physical map of PSI-based cryptosystem can be made more compatible and the spatial light modulator can be applied to upload the plaintext efficiency [15] .
Assume that P (x, y) is the plaintext to be encrypted and M 1 is the random phase key attached to the plaintext. Then, the complex amplitude distribution of the object beam on the CCD plane is:
where F r T λ,z 1 {•} denotes the Fresnel diffraction with the illumination wavelength of λ and the distance z 1 . φ 1 (x, y) represents the phase distribution of random key M 1 . Since the M 2 is placed at z from the CCD plane, the complex amplitude distribution of the reference beam on the detector plane is:
where F r T λ,Z 2 {•} denotes the Fresnel diffraction with the illumination wavelength of λ and the distance of z 2 . α is the relative phase shift value by the PZT mirror. φ 2 (x , y ) is the random phase distribution of the phase-only mask
Note that α is the relative phase shift values by the PZT mirror. Then the encrypted interferograms recoded by the CCD camera is given by (3):
Till now, the encryption is finished. Since the method of processing the encrypted interferograms I (x, y, α) by PSI method is non-uniqueness, the plaintext P (x, y) can be obtained by (4) [13] :
where φ E (x, y) and B E (x, y) in (4) can be obtained by using (5) and (6), respectively:
From (5) and (6), we can see that φ E and B E can be obtained by the interferegrams, which are known resources. The plaintext can be acquired immediately if A R and φ R (x, y) are known according to (4) . However, if the A R and φ R (x, y) are not known, the plaintext cannot be obtained directly. In the next section, we will show that how to breach the system by the proposed COA method in the case that A R and φ R (x, y) are unknown.
Principle of Proposed COA
We proposed a new approach to COA on PSI-based cryptosystem. For the COA method, it is assumed that the phase keys M 1 and M 2 is unknown. The target of attackers is how to retrieve the plaintexts from the ciphertexts directly without use of the keys. Here, we show the principle of the proposed COA method. Assume that attackers intercept three ciphertexts {C 1 , C 2 , C 3 } (which are easy to be acquired with the four corresponding encrypted interferograms by PSI-technique). According to the principle of PSI-based cryptosystem:
Construct the equation group by applying the (7):
where the ciphertext C 1 , C 2 and C 3 are equal to (9) and (10) . Equation (9) is shown as follows:
Equation (10) is shown as follows:
Let A O1 cos(φ 1 ) = x 1 , A O2 cos(φ 2 ) = x 2 , A O3 cos(φ 3 ) = x 3 , (9) can be written as:
The (11) 
Equation (12) can be written as:
where To prevent the determinant of matrix det(A ) = 0, we introduce a perturbation matrix δ which meets the condition that det(δ) = 0.
By solving the linear equations, we can obtain x = [x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ]. Because the matrix δ is a perturbation matrix, there is the equation:
To ensure the (15), the elements of perturbation matrix δ should be small enough and satisfies the condition |δ ij | < 0.005|a ij | (i , j = 1, 2, 3). δ ij and a ij represent the elements of matrix A and δ, respectively.
Let sin(jφ 1 ) = y 1 , sin(jφ 2 ) = y 2 , sin(jφ 3 ) = y 3 , (10) can be written as:
where y = [y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ], and
In the similar way, to prevent the determinant of matrix det(A ) = 0, we introduce a perturbation matrix δ which meets the condition that det(δ) = 0.
By solving the equation, we can obtain y = [y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ]. Because matrix δ is a perturbation matrix of matrix A, there is the equation:
According to (1)- (18), there are:
where I F rT {•} represents the inverse Fresnel transform, P 1 (x, y), P 2 (x, y), and P 3 (x, y) are the original plaintexts, P 1 (x, y), P 2 (x, y), and P 3 (x, y) stand for the cracked plaintexts obtained by the proposed COA. Till now, the proposed COA is finished. We can see that, in the above COA, there are two constraints to ensure the successful attack: 1. The coefficients of the matrix A (a 11 , a 12 , a 13 , a 21 , a 22 , a 23 , a 31 , a 32 , a 33 ) should meet the condition: a 11 + a 12 + a 13 = 0, a 21 + a 22 + a 23 = 0, a 31 + a 32 + a 33 = 0; 2. The determinant of perturbation matrix δ is not zero and the elements of matrix should satisfy the condition |δ ij | < 0.005|a ij | (i , j = 1, 2, 3).
To evaluate the performance of the proposed COA method, the MSE between two images is defined as follows: (20) where P (x, y) represents the original image and P (x, y) stands for the attack results.
Attack Results and Analysis
We have performed a series of simulations to test the feasibility of the proposed COA. In the encryption procedure, the two random phase keys M 1 and M 2 are exp[j φ 1 (x, y)] and exp[j φ 2 (x, y)], respectively. The diffraction distance z 1 (from M 1 to the detector) and z 2 (from M 2 to the detector) are 30mm and 50mm, respectively. In the attack process, the matrix A to construct the linear equations is 
Feasibility of the Proposed COA
First, we test the feasibility of the proposed COA in the simplest case that all the plaintexts are binary image. We prepare three binary plaintexts to verify the feasibility of proposed COA method and each plaintext [ Fig. 2(a) , (e) and (i)] has a size of 256 × 256 pixels. We utilize the proposed COA to crack the three ciphertexts [ Fig. 2(b) -(c), (f)-and (j)-(k)]. Fig. 2(d) , (h), and (l) illustrate the attack results by using the proposed COA. Comparing with the original images [ Fig. 2(a) , (e), and (i)] and attack results [ Fig. 2(d) , (h), (l)], there are some noise on the attack results. However, the main information in the attack results can be obtained. These results demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed COA.
Second, we testify the feasibility of the proposed COA in the case that all the plaintexts are grayscale image. We prepare three gray-scale plaintexts to verify the validity of proposed COA method and each plaintext [ Fig. 3(a)-(c) ] has a size of 256×256 pixels. We utilize the proposed COA to crack the ciphertexts. Fig. 2(d)-(f) show the attack results. Comparing with the original image [ Fig. 3(a)-(c) ] and attack results [ Fig. 3(d)-(f) ], there are some noise on the attack result. However, the main information (Lena, Plane, and Monkey) in the attack results can be obtained. These above results further demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed COA. Further, we test a series of the maxtri A and perturbation matrix δ which meets the two required conditions. The corresponding attack results indicate that the COA is stable and can be work once the two constraints are satisfied. Fig. 3 , which is not shown here for simplicity. These results demonstrate that the proposed COA has a huge space for the different matrix choice.
Robustness of the Proposed COA
In this section, the robustness of the proposed COA has been tested. As the ciphertexts (C 1 , C 2, and C 3 ) may be contaminated by the noise in practical case, the performances of proposed method are tested in the noise contaminated condition. Firstly, we test the case that the ciphertext C 1 , C 2, and C 3 are all contaminated by random noise. The random noise is generated by (Mean[|C i |]}/SNR) * V, where Mean denotes a mean value of the ciphertext, V is 2D variable randomly distributed in a range of [−0.5, 0.5] and SNR represents the signal-to-noise ratio [36] . Fig. 4(a) -(c), (d)-(f), (g)-(i), and (j)-(l) are the attack results when C 1 , C 2 and C 3 are contaminated with different degree noise (SNR value 20, 10, 5, and even 2), respectively. These results demonstrate the robustness of the proposed COA.
